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Abstract
Encryption of data is fundamental to secure communication in the modern world. Beyond encryp-
tion of data lies obfuscation, i.e., encryption of functionality. It is well-known that the most powerful
means of obfuscating classical programs, so-called “black-box obfuscation,” is provably impossible [6].
For years since, obfuscation was believed to always be either impossible or useless, depending on the
particulars of its formal definition. However, several recent results have yielded candidate schemes that
satisfy a definition weaker than black-box, and yet still have numerous applications.
In this work, we initialize the rigorous study of obfuscating programs via quantum-mechanicalmeans.
We define notions of quantum obfuscation which encompass several natural variants. The input to the
obfuscator can describe classical or quantum functionality, and the output can be a circuit description or
a quantum state. The obfuscator can also satisfy one of a number of obfuscation conditions: black-box,
information-theoretic black-box, indistinguishability, and best-possible; the last two conditions come
in three variants: perfect, statistical, and computational. We discuss a number of applications, includ-
ing CPA-secure quantum encryption, quantum fully-homomorphic encryption, and public-key quantum
money. We then prove several impossibility results, extending a number of foundational papers on classi-
cal obfuscation to the quantum setting. We prove that quantum black-box obfuscation is impossible in a
setting where adversaries can possess more than one output of the obfuscator (possibly even on the same
input.) In particular, generic transformation of quantum circuits into black-box-obfuscated quantum cir-
cuits is impossible. We also show that statistical indistinguishability obfuscation is impossible, up to an
unlikely complexity-theoretic collapse. Our proofs involve a new tool: chosen-ciphertext-secure encryp-
tion of quantum data, which was recently shown to be possible provided that quantum-secure one-way
functions exist [5].
We emphasize that our results leave open one intriguing possibility: black-box obfuscation of clas-
sical or quantum circuits into a single, uncloneable quantum state. This indicates that, in spite of our
results, quantum obfuscation may be significantly more powerful than its classical counterpart.
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1 Introduction
The ability to encrypt data is central to modern communications. Basic methods for performing this
task with privately-exchanged encryption keys have been known for hundreds of years. More advanced,
public-key encryption methods were developed much more recently, beginning with the work of Merkle [32]
and Diffie and Hellman [17] in the 1970s. These public-key methods have found widespread practical
application in virtually all Internet communications. More advanced theoretical methods for encrypting
data, such as fully-homomorphic encryption, have only been discovered recently [22], but show great
promise for practical application.
Arguably the most powerful encryption ability is obfuscation; this is the ability to encrypt function-
ality. Obfuscation implies (with some caveats) the ability to perform almost any cryptographic task
imaginable, including public-key and fully-homomorphic encryption. Unlike in the case of data encryp-
tion, our theoretical understanding of obfuscation is still fairly limited.
To understand obfuscation, it is useful to think about an obvious application: protecting intellectual
property in software. In this setting, a software developer wishes to distribute their software to end users.
However, the code contains a number of trade secrets which the developer does not want to become
public. In order to maintain these secrets, the publisher passes the software through an obfuscation
algorithm (or obfuscator) prior to publishing. In this application, the obfuscator must be an efficient
algorithm that satisfies three core properties:
1. functional equivalence: the input/output functionality of the input program does not change;
2. polynomial slowdown: if the input program is efficient, then the output program is efficient;
3. obfuscation: the code of the output program is “hard to understand.”
The last condition can be formulated rigorously in a number of ways. One possibility is the so-called
“virtual black-box” condition, which says that the obfuscated program is no more useful than an impen-
etrable box which simply accepts inputs and produces outputs. While this condition appears to be too
strong in the classical world, there are other formulations (with varying levels of strength and usefulness)
which may be achievable.
The study of encrypting classical data and classical programs is significantly complicated by the
advent of quantum computation. One well-known consequence of the presence of quantum computers
is that certain data encryption schemes, such as those based on the hardness of factoring or the discrete
logarithm, are no longer secure. It is conceivable that certain classical obfuscation schemes are also
not secure against quantum adversaries. On the other hand, quantum mechanics also appears to enable
certain cryptographic tasks (such as information-theoretically secure key exchange) that are impossible
classically. It is thus natural to ask what quantum computation means for obfuscation of programs. In
particular, we would like to answer the following questions:
• what are some natural formulations of quantum-mechanical program obfuscation?
• is it possible to quantumly obfuscate classical and/or quantum programs?
• which of the classical results about obfuscation carry over to the quantum setting?
• are there applications of quantum obfuscation that are impossible classically?
We remark that, in order to address the above questions, we must also properly address the question
of encrypting quantum data—a strictly simpler task than encrypting functionality. While information-
theoretic encryption of quantum data has been considered before, in this setting we are interested in
encryption of quantum data with computational assumptions1. This latter subject has not yet received
significant attention in literature.
Before continuing, we draw attention to the distinction between obfuscating programs and obfuscat-
ing circuits. While these two forms of obfuscation are closely related, there are some important technical
1Note that information-theoretic obfuscation is impossible if the adversary can execute the obfuscated program on all possible
inputs; indeed, a computationally unbounded adversary can use this ability to learn everything there is to know about the program.
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differences. In this work, as in most theoretical works on obfuscation, we will focus on obfuscation of
circuits. We view the circuit model as more convenient; it also tends to be preferred in the theoretical
literature on both cryptography and quantum computation.
1.1 Background
We now briefly review the current state of affairs in research on obfuscation and quantum encryption with
computational security assumptions. The classical case has been studied significantly. On the other hand,
quantum obfuscation has received little to no attention, outside the proposal in [4]. Quantum encryption
is an active current area of research.
1.1.1 Classical obfuscation
Ad-hoc obfuscation of software has been a fairly common practice for some time. In fact, simply com-
piling a program can be viewed as a form of obfuscation. The earliest mention of obfuscation in the
modern study of theoretical cryptography appears to be in the famous paper of Diffie and Hellman [17].
There, it was suggested that public-key cryptosystems might be constructible via obfuscation of private-
key schemes; this was viewed as a reasonable possibility because writing code in an obfuscated manner
seems relatively easy in practice.
The first major result in classical obfuscation was the 2001 proof by Barak et al. that virtual black-box
obfuscation is impossible [6, 7]. Their definition is based on the simulation paradigm. More precisely,
the obfuscation condition (i.e., the third condition in the previous section) states that any efficient algo-
rithm with access to an obfuscated circuit should be simulable by another efficient algorithm with only
oracle (i.e., black-box) access to the original functionality. This definition is very natural in the setting of
the aforementioned “software intellectual property protection” application: the end user can only learn
that which is learnable by simply running the program. Barak et al. proved that there exist circuit fami-
lies which are unobfuscatable under this definition. They also showed that some of the most sought-after
applications of black-box obfuscation are impossible. For instance, they showed that private-key en-
cryption schemes cannot be transformed to public-key ones by obfuscating the encryption circuits in a
generic manner.
The years following the Barak et al. result saw some limited progress in theoretical obfuscation. It
was proved possible for some limited forms of functionality [16, 37], and some additional limits were
placed, e.g., on black-box obfuscation with auxiliary input [24]. An important step in formulating fea-
sible notions of obfuscation was taken by Goldwasser and Rothblum; they defined indistinguishability
obfuscation and best-possible obfuscation [25]. Both of these definitions alter the obfuscation condi-
tion, while leaving the functional-equivalence and polynomial-slowdown conditions unchanged. Under
indistinguishability, it is required that the obfuscator maps functionally-equivalent circuits to indistin-
guishable distributions. Under best-possible, the obfuscator maps any circuit to a circuit from which
the end user can “learn the least.” Both definitions have a perfect, statistical, and computational variant.
Goldwasser and Rothblum proved that the two definitions are equivalent, and that the perfect and sta-
tistical versions are impossible (unless the PH collapses) [25]. This left one possibility: computational
indistinguishability obfuscation. It was widely believed that computational indistinguishability was too
weak of a condition to provide any interesting applications.
In 2013, in a breakthrough result, Garg et al. proposed a convincing candidate for computational in-
distinguishability obfuscation [19]. They proposed an obfuscation scheme for NC1 circuits, based on the
presumed hardness of a problem in multilinear maps; they also showed how to use fully-homomorphic
encryption (with NC1 decryption circuits) to “bootstrap” their NC1 scheme to obfuscation for all cir-
cuits. Around the same time, another breakthrough by Sahai and Waters showed how to use a compu-
tational indistinguishability obfuscator to achieve a wide-range of applications, via a new “punctured
programs” technique [35]. These applications include chosen-ciphertext-secure public-key encryption,
injective trapdoor functions, and oblivious transfer. Sahai and Waters suggested that the applications
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were so wide-ranging that indistinguishability obfuscation might become a “’central hub’ for cryptog-
raphy” [35]. These two breakthroughs were followed by a flurry of new activity in the area, including
several new proposals and applications [8, 11, 12, 13, 21, 29].
1.1.2 Quantum obfuscation
Quantum obfuscation is essentially an unexplored topic, and the present work appears to be the first rig-
orous treatment of the foundational questions. The question of whether quantum obfuscation is possible
was posed as one of Scott Aaronson’s “semi-grand challenges” for quantum computation [1]. Since so
little work on quantum obfuscation has appeared, our brief discussion will also mention some results
that we believe are related.
In [2], Aaronson proposed two relevant results. The first was a complexity-theoretic no-cloning
theorem, stating that cloning an unknown, random state by means of a black-box “reflection oracle”
requires exponentially many queries. The second theorem stated that an oracle exists relative to which
“software copy-protection” is possible. Unfortunately, a full version of [2] with proofs never appeared,
although the complexity-theoretic no-cloning theorem was eventually proved in a paper on quantum
money [3]. In related work, Mosca and Stebila proposed a black-box quantum money scheme, and
suggested the possibility of using a quantum circuit obfuscator in place of the black box [33].
More recently, Alagic, Jeffery and Jordan proposed obfuscators for both classical (reversible) cir-
cuits and quantum circuits, based on ideas from topological quantum computation [4]. The proposed
obfuscator compiles the circuits into braids using certain high-dimensional representations of the braid
group, and then applies an algorithm for putting braids into normal form. Although it is efficient, this
algorithm does not satisfy any of the aforementioned obfuscation definitions; instead, it satisfies perfect
indistinguishability for a restricted set of circuit equivalences. The usefulness of such an obfuscator is
unclear at this time.
1.1.3 Quantum encryption
In order to discuss quantum obfuscation of functionality, we require a more basic primitive: quantum
encryption of data. As we will see later, information-theoretic encryption is insufficient for our purposes,
and we must thus rely on computational assumptions. In particular, we require (i.) reusability of the key,
and (ii.) chosen-ciphertext security. Recent results have shown that this is possible to achieve under the
assumption that quantum-resistant one-way functions exist [5]. For readability, we briefly summarize
the relevant results from [5] below, and in more detail in Section 2.
1. Quantum encryption schemes. One can define a notion of symmetric-key encryption scheme
for quantum states, with reusable keys; these schemes consist of three quantum algorithms (key
generation, encryption, and decryption) which satisfy correctness: under a fixed key, encryption
followed by decryption must be equivalent to the identity. Such schemes first appeared in [14].
2. Chosen-ciphertext security for quantum encryption. One may also define IND-CCA1 secu-
rity (or indistinguishability of ciphertexts under non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks) for these
schemes; this formalizes the idea of a “lunchtime attack,” where an adversary has complete ac-
cess to all aspects of the encryption scheme except the key itself, and is tasked with decrypting a
challenge ciphertext later (presumably after lunch.)
3. An IND-CCA1-secure construction. If quantum-secure one-way functions (qOWF) exist, then
so do IND-CCA1-secure symmetric-key encryption schemes for quantum states. These qOWFs
are deterministic classical functions which are easy to compute, but hard to invert for quantum
adversaries.
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1.2 Summary of results
In this section, we summarize our results and discussions. These are divided by subject, with quantum
encryption covered in Section 2, quantum black-box obfuscation in Section 3, and quantum indistin-
guishability obfuscation in Section 4.
1.2.1 Quantum black-box obfuscation
Definitions. Our main results concern definitions, applications, and (im)possibility of quantum obfus-
cation in the virtual black-box setting. We will begin by defining the following.
1. Quantum black-box obfuscator. This is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm O which accepts
quantum circuits C as input, and produces quantum states O(C) as output. It preserves functionality,
in the sense that there is a publicly known way to use O(C) and any input state |ψ〉 to produce the
state C|ψ〉 . It satisfies a black-box condition, which states that for polynomial-time quantum
algorithms, possession of O(C) can be simulated by black-box access to C. This definition is a
natural analogue of the classical black-box definition given in [7].
2. Quantum “two-circuit” black-box obfuscator. This obfuscator is precisely as above, except the
obfuscation condition is strengthened to hold over arbitrary pairs of circuits (C1,C2). For us, this
definition will be primarily useful because of its role in establishing certain impossibility results.
3. Information-theoretic quantum black-box obfuscator. This is a modification of the above defi-
nition, in which we posit that any adversary with access to O(C) can be simulated by a polynomial-
time quantum simulator with black-box access to C. This definition is impossible classically, for
obvious reasons: both O(C) and O can be copied and reused an arbitrary number of times, enabling
unbounded adversaries to discover everything about C.
Impossibility. We prove three impossibility results, which place several important restrictions on
quantum obfuscation. Our impossibility proofs are based on the ideas of Barak et al. [7], with several
important quantum adaptations, and a new quantum ingredient: the aforementioned IND-CCA1 quantum
encryption.
1. Two-state black-box obfuscation is impossible. We prove that there exist families of circuit pairs
which can reveal a secret if one is in possession of a circuit description for both of them, but not
if one only has black-box access. This impossibility persists even if the obfuscation output is a
quantum state, as opposed to a circuit description. Unlike the other results, it is also true even if
the obfuscated states are not reusable.
2. If qOWFs exist, then obfuscation with more than one output is impossible. For this proof,
we combine the pairs from the circuit families in the two-circuit impossibility proof in order to
build a single unobfuscatable family. The ability to execute obfuscated states from this family on
themselves is crucial here, and has two requirements: (i.) access to more than one obfuscation,
even if the obfuscations are quantum states, and (ii.) secure encryption, which in turn requires the
existence of qOWFs. This result applies both to quantum black-box obfuscators (as in the first
definition above) and the information-theoretic variant (as in the third definition above.)
3. Classical algorithms for quantum obfuscation are impossible, unconditionally. This result
follows directly from the previous result and Application 1 below. It can be viewed as an extension
of the original Barak et al. impossibility result to the case of quantum functionality and quantum
adversaries.
We emphasize that, while our techniques are very similar to Barak et al., our results are not a simple con-
sequence of the fact that classical functions (and in particular, the Barak et al. unobfuscatable functions)
are special cases of quantum functions. This “special case” argument fails for obvious reasons when the
output of the obfuscator can be a quantum state. As it turns out, it also fails when the output is a quantum
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circuit; briefly, the reasons are (i.) it is now permitted to specify (even approximate) quantum circuits for
classical functions, (ii.) the black-box simulator now has quantum access, which is significantly more
powerful than classical (see, e.g., [27]) and (iii.) the Barak et al. adversary is insufficient since it can
only perform classical gates homomorphically. The last point is where the aforementioned quantum
encryption tools become necessary.
Applications. We then move on to discuss potential applications of quantum black-box obfuscators.
We emphasize that (with the exception of the first one), all of these applications are still possible in
some form in spite of the above impossibility result. We view this as a strong indication that quantum
obfuscation should be studied further. While some of the applications are analogues of known classical
applications (as outlined in [7],) the last is special to the quantum setting. We are certain that many
other quantum-specific applications are possible, given the combined advantage of obfuscation and no-
cloning.
1. Quantum-secure one-way functions. We show that, if there exists a classical probabilistic algo-
rithm for quantum obfuscation, then quantum-secure one-way functions exist. The above impos-
sibility result rules this out, but the implication is nonetheless interesting; for one, it enables the
very proof of the impossibility result itself! The one-way functions are essentially the functions
computed by the obfuscator (with fixed randomness) on circuits with a “hidden output.” We are
unable to extend this application to the setting of efficient quantum algorithms for obfuscation.
We leave this as an interesting open problem, and note its connection to developing foundational
primitives for quantum encryption.
2. IND-CPA-secure private-key quantum encryption. In this application, the obfuscation algo-
rithm can be quantum; moreover, we do not demand the existence of one-way functions or any
other primitive.
3. qOWF imply IND-CPA public-key encryption. This application combines IND-CCA1-secure
private-key encryption (which follows from qOWFs) with obfuscation of the encryption circuits.
The result is public-key encryption of quantum states without the need for trapdoor permutations
(unlike in [5] and, indirectly, in [14].)
4. qOWF imply IND-CPA quantum fully homomorphic encryption. This application combines
the previous application, together with obfuscation of a universal decrypt-compute-encrypt circuit.
Depending on the properties of the obfuscator, it may also satisfy compactness (the requirement
that communication between client and server does not scale with the size of the computation.)
5. Public-key quantum money. Using circuit obfuscation to produce public-key quantum money
was first proposed by Mosca and Stebila [33], using a complexity-theoretic no-cloning theorem
proposed by Aaronson [2] and proved by Aaronson and Christiano [3]. We outline the ideas here,
and discuss the new limitations placed by our results.
We emphasize that all the above applications except quantum money also work for achieving clas-
sical functionality from a quantum obfuscator; however, depending on the details of the obfuscator and
the application, this may require quantum algorithms for encryption and decryption, or even quantum
ciphertexts.
1.2.2 Quantum indistinguishability obfuscation
Lastly, we consider an alternative formulation of obfuscation, motivated by the classical definitions of
indistinguishability obfuscation and best-possible obfuscation, as set down by Barak et al. [7] and Gold-
wasser and Rothblum [25]. We establish quantum analogues of the central results in those classical
papers. In this setting, rather than comparing the obfuscation of the circuit to that of a black-box, we
compare it to the obfuscations of other, functionally-equivalent circuits. Starting with the new definitions,
our results are as follows.
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1. Quantum indistinguishability obfuscator. Just as in the black-box definition, this is a polynomial-
time quantum algorithm O which accepts quantum circuits C as input, and produces “functionally-
equivalent” quantum states O(C) as output. The obfuscation condition now states that functionally
equivalent circuits are mapped to indistinguishable states. Based on the kind of indistinguishabil-
ity deployed in the definition, there are three variants of an indistinguishability obfuscator: perfect,
statistical, and computational.
2. Quantum best-possible obfuscator. This is an algorithm precisely as above, except for the ob-
fuscation condition: it now states that O(C) is the state that “leaks least,” among all states which
are “functionally-equivalent” to C. There are again three variants: perfect, statistical, and compu-
tational.
3. Equivalence of definitions. We prove that each of the three variants of quantum indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation is equivalent to the analogous variant of quantum best-possible obfuscation, so
long as the obfuscator is efficient.
4. Impossibility of perfect and statistical indistinguishability obfuscation. We end with a quan-
tum version of the main result of [25]: a proof that perfect and statistical quantum indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation is impossible, unless coQMA is contained in QSZK. We remark that an anal-
ogous containment in the classical setting (i.e., coMA ⊆ SZK) would imply a collapse of the
polynomial-time hierarchy to the second level. Moreover, for the case of obfuscating arbitrary
quantum computations (i.e., completely positive, trace-preserving maps), we obtain that statistical
quantum indistinguishability obfuscation would imply that PSPACE is contained in QSZK. One
consequence of these results is that extending the obfuscator proposed in [4] to full indistinguisha-
bility is impossible, barring highly unlikely collapses of complexity classes.
5. Application: witness encryption for QMA. Motivated by an analogue discussed in [20, 19], we
show that a quantum indistinguishability obfuscator enables witness encryption for QMA. A wit-
ness encryption scheme for a language L in QMA encrypts plaintexts x using a particular instance
l. The security condition states that, if l ∈ L, then a valid witness w for l ∈ L allows decryption;
on the other hand, if l /∈ L, then ciphertexts are indistinguishable. While witness encryption has
several applications classically [20], the quantum analogue has not been considered previously.
We remark that, in the classical setting, indistinguishability obfuscation also implies functional en-
cryption [19] and many more applications through the very successful “punctured programs” technique
developed by Sahai and Waters [35]. We suspect that these results can also be adapted to the quantum
setting, but leave them open for now.
1.3 Notation and terminology
In this section, we set down some notation and basic terminology which we will use throughout the rest
of the paper.
1.3.1 Classical
We will assume that the state space of a classical device can be identified with sets of bitstrings, i.e.,
{0,1}n for some positive integer n. The notation x ∈R {0,1} will mean that x is an n-bit string selected
uniformly at random. The set of all bitstrings (of arbitrary length) will be denoted by {0,1}∗. Classical
functions will then be maps f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m from one set of bitstrings to another. We will also
sometimes consider function families, written f : {0,1}∗→{0,1}∗; these can be thought of as a function
family { fn}n>0 indexed by the input size n.
A classical circuit C is a sequence of local boolean gates which, when composed together, implement
some (in general irreversible) function fC : {0,1}n → {0,1}m. The input size of C is n, the output size
is m, and the number of gates is denoted by |C|. A probabilistic circuit is also a circuit, but with the
input bits divided into two registers: the input register, and the “coin” register. A normal execution of
a probabilistic circuit involves initializing the coin register with completely random bits, and inserting
the input into the input register. We will frequently discuss circuit ensembles; these are infinite families
{Cn}n>0 of circuits, one for each possible input size, so that the size of circuit Cn is bounded by some
fixed polynomial function of n. We say that a circuit ensemble is uniform if there is a deterministic
polynomial-time Turing Machine which, on input 1n, outputs a classical description of Cn. We will
also sometimes make use of distributions of circuit ensembles; these are infinite families C= {Cn}n>0
where each Cn is a finite family of circuits of input size n, along with a probability distribution PC,n. For
a bitstring x, the notation C(x) will then denote the probability distribution (on bitstrings) resulting from
running a random circuit from the family C|x|, selected according the distribution PC,|x|.
A deterministic classical algorithm A is simply a circuit ensemble. Running A on an input bitstring
x involves selecting the circuit with the appropriate input size, and executing it with input x. If the circuit
ensemble is uniform, we will say that A is efficient; more precisely, it is then a classical deterministic
polynomial-time algorithm (PT for short.) A probabilistic algorithm A′ is an algorithm whose circuits
are probabilistic. Running A′ on an input bitstring x involves selecting the circuit with the appropriate
input size, initializing its coin register with uniformly random bits, and then executing it with input x. If
the circuits of A′ are polynomial-time uniform, we say that A′ is an efficient, or classical probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm (PPT for short.) We will frequently use PPTs to model the most general
efficient classical algorithms.
1.3.2 Quantum
For our purposes, the space of pure states of a quantum device will be identified with a Hilbert space
Hn ∼= (C2)
⊗n of a finite number n of qubits. We will identify some fixed orthonormal basis (called the
computational basis) of Hn with the corresponding space {0,1}n of classical states, so that, e.g, |x〉
for x ∈ {0,1}n denotes a basis element of Hn. The space of density operators (i.e., general quantum
states) of n qubits will be denoted D(Hn); this is the set of positive semidefinite, Hermitian trace-one
operators in End(Hn). A state in D(Hn) can be interpreted as a probabilistic mixture ∑ j p j
∣∣ϕ j〉〈ϕ j∣∣ of
pure states, albeit not in a unique way. We will discuss valid quantum transformations of three types.
The first are measurements, which act on a state |ψ〉 ∈Hn by projecting some or all of the qubits into the
computational basis states {|0〉, |1〉}. The second are unitary maps, i.e., linear operators U : Hn →Hn
satisfying U†U = 1n, where 1n denotes the n-qubit identity operator. The third are CPTP maps, i.e.,
completely positive trace-preserving maps Φ : D(Hn)→D(Hm). CPTP maps are the most general type
of evolution, encompassing unitary maps, measurement, and adding or discarding (or tracing out) qubits.
For example, a unitary operator U ∈ U(Hn) can be expressed as a CPTP map by writing ρ 7→UρU†,
where ρ ∈D(Hn).
A quantum circuit C is a sequence of local unitary gates on a fixed number (say n) of qubits; these
gates , when composed together, implement some unitary operator UC ∈ U(2n). Definitions of circuit
ensembles and distributions over circuit ensembles are defined precisely as in the classical case. A
quantum polynomial time algorithm (or QPT for short) A is a uniform ensemble of quantum circuits;
algorithms can also include measurements and discarding (or tracing-out) of subsystems, so long as these
also admit efficient classical descriptions. The input and output size of a quantum algorithm can vary,
and will have to be deduced from context. For example, given a QPT A, the expression Pr[A(|0n〉) = 1]
will take the value zero unless A has a specific, labeled output qubit which is measured at the end of the
computation.
2 Quantum encryption
In this section, we discuss a recently developed encryption scheme for quantum states, with computa-
tional assumptions [5]. In Section 2.1, we briefly recall how to construct a classical function which
appears pseudorandom to quantum adversaries, by means of a function which is one-way against quan-
tum adversaries. In Section 2.2, we define a notion of symmetric-key quantum encryption, together
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with associated notions of IND-CPA and IND-CCA1 security. We then describe a scheme which is
IND-CCA1-secure under the assumption that quantum-secure one-way functions exist.
2.1 Quantum-secure pseudorandomness
We begin with two primitives for encryption: quantum-secure one-way functions, and quantum-secure
pseudorandom functions. These are both classical, efficiently computable functions which are in some
sense resistant to quantum analysis. In the case of one-way functions, we demand that inversion is hard;
in the case of pseudorandom functions, we demand that distinguishing from perfectly random functions
is hard.
Definition 1. A PT-computable function f : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ is a quantum-secure one-way function
(qOWF) if for every QPT A,
Prx∈R{0,1}n
[
A( f (x),1n) ∈ f−1( f (x))] ≤ negl(n) ,
where the probability is taken over x ∈R {0,1}n as well as the measurements of A.
Definition 2. A PT-computable function family fk : {0,1}n → {0,1}m is a quantum-secure pseudoran-
dom function (qPRF) if for every QPT A,∣∣Prk∈R{0,1}n [A fk(1n) = 1]−Prg∈RFn,m [Ag(1n) = 1]∣∣≤ negl(n) ,
where Fn,m denotes the space of all functions from {0,1}n to {0,1}m.
Classically, one-way functions are the fundamental primitive underpinning encryption. A series of
basic results shows that one-way functions can be turned into pseudorandom functions, which can then
be used for defining probabilistic encryption schemes. This series of results carries over to the quantum-
secure case without much of a change (although some proofs are somewhat more involved.) For example,
it is known how to construct qPRFs from qOWFs.
Theorem 1. If quantum-secure one-way functions exist, then so do quantum-secure pseudorandom func-
tions.
Proof. (Sketch.) It is folklore that the well-known Ha˚stad et al. result that pseudorandom generators
can be constructed from any one-way function [28] carries over to the quantum-secure case. Roughly
speaking, the reasoning is that the reduction in the proof is done in a “black-box” way, i.e., only by
feeding inputs into the adversary and then analyzing the resulting outputs. The quantum-secure case
then simply involves replacing PPTs with QPTs in the appropriate places. Proving that the standard
GGM construction [23] of PRFs from pseudorandom generators is still secure in the setting of quantum
adversaries is more involved; this was established by Zhandry [39].
2.2 Symmetric-key encryption of quantum states
It is well-known how to encrypt quantum states with information-theoretic security, via the so-called
quantum one-time pad. To encrypt a single-qubit state ρ , we choose two classical bits at random, use
them to select a random Pauli matrix P ∈ {1,X ,Y,Z}, and perform ρ 7→ PρP†. To encrypt an n-qubit
quantum state ρ , we select r ∈R {0,1}2n and apply
ρ 7−→ PrρP†r , (2.1)
where Pr denotes the element of the n-qubit Pauli group indexed by r.
One disadvantage of the quantum one-time pad is that parties must share two bits of randomness for
every qubit which they wish to transmit securely. In particular, one cannot securely exchange multiple
messages with the same key. To address this issue, we must settle for computational security assumptions
and use pseudorandomness to select r. A general encryption scheme for quantum states is then defined
as follows.
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Definition 3. A symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme is a triple of QPTs:
• (key generation) KeyGen : 1n 7−→ k ∈ {0,1}n;
• (encryption) Enck : D(Hm)−→D(Hc);
• (decryption) Deck : D(Hc)−→D(Hm);
where m and c are polynomial functions of n, and the QPTs satisfy ‖Deck ◦Enck −1m‖⋄ ≤ negl(n) for
all k ∈ suppKeyGen(1n).
Public-key quantum encryption schemes are defined in an analogous manner. The encryption schemes
we will need must produce ciphertexts which are computationally indistinguishable. In some cases, the
ciphertexts will need to remain indistinguishable even to adversaries which possess oracle access to
the encryption algorithm (and sometimes also even the decryption algorithm.) This security notion is
captured by the following definition.
Definition 4. A symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme is IND-secure if for all QPTs A,A′,∣∣Pr[(A′ ◦Enck ⊗1s ◦A) ·1n = 1]−Pr[(A′ ◦ΞEnck|0m〉〈0m|⊗1s ◦A) ·1n = 1]∣∣≤ negl(n) ,
where Ξσ : ρ 7→ σ is the “forgetful” map, and s is a polynomial function of n. If A and A′ have oracle
access to Enck, then we say that the scheme is IND-CPA secure. If in addition A′ has oracle access to
Deck, then we say that the scheme is IND-CCA1 secure.
The two QPTs A and A′ together model the adversary. The definition above captures the idea of a
certain “security game” between an adversary and a challenger. The game proceeds in steps: (i.) the
key is selected and the adversary receives access to the appropriate oracles, (ii.) after some computation,
the adversary transmits the first part of a bipartite state ρms to a challenger, (iii.) the challenger either
encrypts this or replaces it with the encryption of |0m〉〈0m|, and then returns the result to the adversary,
and (iv.) the adversary must decide which choice the challenger made. The scheme is considered secure
if the adversary can do no better than random guessing. As shown in [5], this definition is equivalent to a
security notion called semantic security; roughly speaking, this notion captures the idea that anyone that
tries to compute anything about a plaintext gains no advantage by possessing its encryption. In addition,
Definition 4 is equivalent to several natural variants, where e.g., the challenger chooses to encrypt one of
two messages provided by the adversary, or where the game is played over multiple rounds. The latter
guarantees security of transmitting multiple ciphertexts produced via encryption with the same key.
We now show how to use qPRFs to construct simple symmetric-key quantum encryption schemes
that satisfy all of the above security conditions.
Theorem 2. If quantum-secure pseudorandom functions exist, then so do IND-CCA1-secure symmetric-
key quantum encryption schemes.
Proof. Let { fk} be a qPRF. For simplicity we assume that each fk is a map from {0,1}n to {0,1}2n.
Recall that for r ∈ {0,1}2n, Pr denotes the element of the n-qubit Pauli group indexed by r. Consider the
following scheme:
• KeyGen(1n): output k ∈R {0,1}n;
• Enck(ρ): choose r ∈R {0,1}n; output |r〉〈r|⊗Pfk(r)ρP
†
fk(r);
• Deck(|r〉〈r|⊗σ): output P†fk(r)ρPfk(r) .
In the decryption algorithm, we may assume that the first register is always measured prior to decrypting.
Correctness of the scheme is straightforward to check: decrypting with the same key and randomness
simply undoes the Pauli operation.
We now sketch the proof that the scheme is IND-CCA1 secure. The key observation is that each
query to the encryption oracle is no more useful than receiving a pair (r, fk(r)) for r ∈R {0,1}2n, and that
each decryption oracle is no more useful than receiving a pair (r, fk(r)) for a string r of the adversary’s
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choice. Thus the adversary learns at most a polynomial number of values of fk. Now, if fk is a perfectly
random function, then these values are completely uncorrelated to the one used to encrypt the challenge.
The scheme is thus secure simply by the information-theoretic security of the quantum one-time pad.
On the other hand, if fk is a function in a qPRF, Definition 2 guarantees oracle indistinguishability from
perfectly random functions. It follows that, if (A,A′) can break the actual scheme, then by computational
indistinguishability they would also break the perfect scheme, which is impossible.
We emphasize that the above proof shows that, even in the case where the adversary chooses the
randomness r used by the Enck and Deck oracles, the scheme remains secure. Of course, the randomness
for the challenge encryption must still be selected by the challenger. Finally, by combining Theorem 1
and Theorem 2, we have the following.
Theorem 3. If quantum-secure one-way functions exist, then so do IND-CCA1-secure symmetric-key
quantum encryption schemes.
3 Quantum black-box obfuscation
In this section, we discuss the virtual black-box framework for obfuscating quantum computations. We
begin in Section 3.1 with a definition of black-box quantum obfuscator, motivated both by the classical
analogue and an intuitive notion of what a “good obfuscator” should achieve. In Section 3.2, we outline
several interesting cryptographic consequences that would follow from the existence of such an obfusca-
tor. Finally, in Section 3.3, we prove a few impossibility results which restrict the range of possibilities
for the existence of black-box quantum obfuscators. Interestingly, our results leave open some possibil-
ities, which include (restricted versions) of the most interesting applications. Indeed, it is conceivable
that quantum obfuscation could be significantly more powerful than its classical counterpart.
3.1 Definitions
Any reasonable notion of obfuscation involves giving the obfuscated circuit O(C) to an untrusted party.
We accept as fundamental the idea that this obfuscated circuit should implement some particular, chosen
functionality fC, and that the object O(C) allows the untrusted party to execute that functionality. In
the black-box formulation of obfuscation, we demand that this is effectively all that the untrusted party
will ever be able to do. The rigorous formulation uses the simulation paradigm: anything which can be
efficiently learned from the obfuscated circuit, should also be efficiently learnable simply by evaluating
fC some polynomial number of times. This “virtual black-box” notion was first formulated by Barak et
al. [7], and proved impossible to satisfy generically in the classical case.
In the quantum case, there are several complications. First, we are considering the obfuscation
of quantum functionalities. This implies that the end user (and hence also any adversary) should be
in possession of a quantum computer, and likewise for the simulator. Second, it is conceivable that
the obfuscation may not just be another quantum circuit, which is simply a classical state describing
a quantum computation. The obfuscator might instead output a quantum state, which is then to be
employed by the end user to execute the desired functionality in some well-specified manner. These
considerations motivate the following definition.
Definition 5. A black-box quantum obfuscator is a quantum algorithm O and a QPT J such that when-
ever C is an n-qubit quantum circuit, the output of O is an m-qubit state O(C) satisfying
1. (polynomial expansion) m = poly(n);
2. (functional equivalence) ∥∥J(O(C)⊗ρ)−UCρU†C∥∥tr ≤ negl(n) for all ρ ∈D(Hn);
3. (virtual black-box) for every QPT A there exists a QPT SUC such that∣∣∣Pr[A(O(C)) = 1]−Pr[SUC(|0n〉)= 1]∣∣∣≤ negl(n) .
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We emphasize that while the “interpreter” algorithm J must be polynomial-time, the obfuscator itself
need not be. In applications, it will be necessary to make the obfuscator polynomial-time; on the other
hand, our impossibility results will hold even for inefficient obfuscators. One could consider variants of
Definition 5 where the interpreter algorithm is fixed once and for all, or where O(C) itself consists of
both a quantum “advice state” and a circuit which the end user should execute on the advice state and
the desired input. It is straightforward to show that all of these variants are equivalent, in the sense that a
black-box quantum obfuscator of each variant exists if and only if the other variants exist. Since we are
primarily concerned with possibility vs impossibility, we will stick with the formulation in Definition 5.
We also remark that the interpreter is a natural addition to the classical black-box definition when passing
to the quantum case. In order for the definition to make sense, there should be some efficient way to use
O(C) to implement UC; whatever that efficient procedure is, we have here called it an interpreter and
denoted it by J.
We also point out that the no-cloning theorem opens up the possibility of computationally unbounded
adversaries. In the classical case, such an adversary could simply execute the circuit on every input, and
thus learn far more than is possible for a polynomial-time black-box simulator. Quantumly, however, a
computationally unbounded adversary is restricted both by the no-cloning theorem and the limitations of
measurement. The adversary may not be able to acquire multiple copies of the obfuscated state, and the
single state may be partially (or completely) destroyed when measured. It is thus not a priori clear that
an unbounded adversary could always outmatch a polynomial-time black-box simulator. The appropriate
definition is a straightforward modification of Definition 5, where we replace the third condition with the
following:
3. (information-theoretic virtual black-box) for every quantum adversary A there exists a QPT SUC
such that ∣∣∣Pr[A(O(C)) = 1]−Pr[SUC(|0n〉)= 1]∣∣∣≤ negl(n) .
3.2 Applications of efficient black-box obfuscators
In this section, we motivate the study of quantum black-box obfuscation by giving a few example ap-
plications. Unsurprisingly, these applications require that the obfuscation algorithm is itself quantum
polynomial-time; strictly speaking, this is not required of Definition 5. Many of these applications are
motivated by known classical applications of classical black-box obfuscators. Although our impossi-
bility results will put some restrictions on these applications, they remain interesting. In fact, some
of the applications (such as quantum-secure one-way functions) will be used in the impossibility proofs
themselves. We point out that, while most of the applications below are written in terms of quantum func-
tionality (e.g., encryption of quantum states), one can just as well consider the weaker case of classical
functionality, in this case achieved via quantum means (e.g., via a quantum algorithm for obfuscation.)
3.2.1 Quantum-secure one-way functions
The first application shows that, if there exists a classical algorithm for obfuscating quantum compu-
tations, then quantum-secure one-way functions exist. By the results discussed in Section 2, this also
implies the existence of quantum-secure pseudorandom generators, quantum-secure pseudorandom func-
tions, and IND-CCA1-secure symmetric-key quantum encryption schemes.
Proposition 1. If there exists a classical probabilistic algorithm which is a quantum black-box obfusca-
tor, then quantum-secure one-way functions exist.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as that of Lemma 3.8 in [7]. For all a ∈ {0,1}n and b ∈ {0,1},
we define
Ua,b : |x, y〉 7−→
{
|a, y⊕ b〉 if x = a;
|x, y〉 otherwise.
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Define a function f : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ by f (a,b,r) = Or(Ua,b) where O is the obfuscator2 as in the
hypothesis, and Or denotes the same algorithm, but with randomness coins initialized to r. Clearly,
inverting f requires computing b from Or(Ua,b). Moreover, with only black-box access to Ua,b (for
uniformly random a,b) the probability of correctly outputing b in polynomial time is at most 1/2+
negl(n). By the black-box property of O, we then have
Pra,b[A( f (a,b,r)) = b] = Pra,b[A(Or(a,b)) = b]
≤ Pra,b
[
SUa,b(1n) = b
]
+ negl(n)
≤
1
2
+ negl(n) ,
which completes the proof.
We remark that the above proof fails if the obfuscator is a quantum algorithm—even if its output
is itself classical. The issue is that one-way functions must be deterministic; while one can turn a
classical probabilistic algorithm into a deterministic one by making the coins part of the input, this is
not possible quantumly. We leave the problem of constructing cryptographically useful primitives from
a fully quantum obfuscator (or even just from a quantum encryption scheme) as an interesting open
question.
3.2.2 CPA-secure private-key quantum encryption
Can we say anything about encryption of data if we know that quantum algorithms for quantum black-
box obfuscation exist? While we do not know how to extract one-way functions, we can nonetheless
produce useful encryption schemes, as follows.
Proposition 2. If quantum black-box obfuscators exist, then so do IND-CPA-secure symmetric-key quan-
tum encryption schemes.
Proof. (Sketch.) Let (O,J) be a quantum black-box obfuscator. We consider an adaptation of the uni-
tary operator Ua,b defined above, but now with Pauli group action instead of XOR, and with two n-bit
registers:
U ′r,k : |x, y〉 7−→
{∣∣x, P†r y〉 if x = k;
|x, y〉 otherwise,
Now consider the following scheme for encrypting n-qubit quantum states.
• KeyGen(1n): output k ∈R {0,1}n;
• Enck(ρ): choose r ∈R {0,1}n; output PrρP†r ⊗O(Ur,k);
• Deck(σ ⊗ τ): output the second register of J(τ ⊗|k〉〈k|⊗σ).
To check correctness, we apply the functionality-preserving property of the obfuscator. A decryption of
a valid encryption with the same key yields
Deck(Enck(ρ)) = Tr1
[
J(O(Ur,k)⊗|k〉〈k|⊗PrρP†r )
]
= Tr1
[
Ur,k(|k〉〈k|⊗PrρP†r )U†r,k
]
= Tr1 [|k〉〈k|⊗ρ ]
= ρ .
as desired. IND-CPA security follows from the black-box property of the obfuscator, as follows. Let
A be an adversary with access to the encryption oracle. Since the output of the encryption is a product
2For simplicity of notation, we omit J and assume that f (a,b,r) = Or(Ua,b) is in fact a classical circuit for Ua,b.
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state, A can be simulated by an adversary S that has only the first register of the ciphertext (i.e., PrρP†r )
and black-box access to the unitary U ′r,k. It’s then clear that S can only succeed in the challenge stage of
Definition 4 by discovering the secret input for U ′r,k or by guessing the response to the challenge. In any
case, S (and hence also A) succeeds with probability at most 1/2+ negl(n).
3.2.3 Public-key encryption from private-key encryption
As we now show, combining black-box obfuscation with one-way functions yields even stronger encryp-
tion functionality.
Proposition 3. If quantum black-box obfuscators and quantum-secure one-way functions exist, then so
do IND-CPA-secure public-key quantum encryption schemes.
Proof. (Sketch.) Under the hypothesis, Theorem 3 implies the existence of IND-CCA1-secure symmetric-
key encryption schemes for quantum states. Let (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be such a scheme; for concreteness,
we may take the scheme described in Theorem 2. For x ∈ {0,1}n, let Enc(x) denote the encryption cir-
cuit for key x; this is the circuit that accepts two input registers (one for randomness, and one for the
plaintext) and outputs the ciphertext. Now define a public-key encryption scheme (KeyGen′,Enc′,Dec′)
as follows.
• KeyGen′(1n): output sk := k ∈R {0,1}n (secret key) and pk := O
(
Enc(sk)
) (public key);
• Enc′pk(ρ): choose r ∈R {0,1}n; output pk(|r〉〈r|⊗ρ);
• Dec′sk(σ): output Decsk(σ) .
The correctness of this scheme follows directly from the functionality-preserving property of O and
the correctness of the private-key scheme. To prove IND-CPA security for the public-key scheme, we
rely on the black-box property. It implies that any QPT adversary A with access to the public key can be
simulated by a QPT S having only black-box access to Enc(sk). The QPT S, in turn, can be simulated by a
QPT S′ which has both decryption and encryption oracles for the private-key scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec).
It may not be immediately obvious that the decryption oracle is necessary; this is the case because black-
box access to Enc(sk) enables S to select the randomness used for encryption, thus gaining the ability to
evaluate pairs (r, fsk(r)) where f is the qPRF from the private-key scheme.
Now we have that, if A can distinguish ciphertexts during the challenge, then so can S′; since the ci-
phertexts themselves are the same for the public-key scheme and the private-key scheme, this contradicts
the IND-CCA1 security of the private-key scheme.
A few remarks are in order. First, in [5] it is shown that IND-CPA-secure public-key quantum
encryption schemes exist under the assumption that quantum-secure trapdoor permutations exist. This
is a stronger assumption than one-way functions. Proposition 3 can then be thought of as replacing
this strengthening of assumptions with an obfuscator. In [14] it is shown how to use quantum-secure
classical public-key encryption to produce quantum public-key encryption (by encrypting the key for
the quantum one-time pad); this amounts to the same assumption on primitives as in [5]. An important
difference between [5, 14] and Proposition 3 is that the scheme from Proposition 3 may have public keys
which are quantum states. Such schemes have not been considered before, and (due to no-cloning) would
have significantly different features from their classical counterparts.
An interesting question is if there could be public-key encryption for classical data with classical
ciphertexts, but where the encryption procedure is performed by a quantum algorithm. While this ques-
tion remains open, our impossibility results will show that this cannot be achieved in a generic way via
Proposition 3.
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3.2.4 Quantum fully homomorphic encryption
We briefly recall the idea of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). For thorough definitions and the
appropriate notions of security in the fully quantum case, see [14]. Without considering all of the details,
we will view QFHE as an encryption scheme (just as in Definition 3), but where KeyGen produces an
extra “evaluation” key keval, and there is an “evaluation” algorithm:
• Evalkeval : D(Hm ⊗Hg)−→D(Hm).
We imagine a party (henceforth, server) in possession of keval and a ciphertext Enck(ρ) provided by
another party (henceforth, client.) The evaluation algorithm then enables the server to produce the ci-
phertext Enck(GkρG†k), where G is a gate of the server’s choice. A classical string describing the choice
of gate G (and which qubits k,k+ 1, . . . of ρ it should be applied to) is input into the register Hg. In
general, we may consider the case where keval is itself a quantum state. Depending on the details of the
scheme, this key may be partly or fully consumed by Eval; indeed, this is the case in [14]. Depending
on the consumption rate, this might violate the (classically standard) compactness requirement for FHE,
namely that the amount of communication between the client and the server should scale only with the
size of the ciphertext, and not with the size of the computation the server wishes to perform.
Proposition 4. If quantum black-box obfuscators and one-way functions exist, then so do IND-CPA-
secure quantum fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
Proof. (Sketch.) We will consider the public-key case, which turns out to be simpler. Let (O,J) be a
quantum obfuscator, and (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) an IND-CPA-secure public-key scheme. We adapt KeyGen
to produce an evaluation key, and describe the evaluation algorithm. We will require a universal circuit
Uµ for performing gates on m-qubit states; this circuit accepts two inputs: an m-qubit state, and a de-
scription of a gate and indices of the qubits to which the gate should be applied. In our usage, m will be
the number of qubits of the ciphertext state.
• KeyGen′(1n): output KeyGen(1n) = (sk, pk) and keval = O(Encpk ◦Uµ ◦Decsk);
• Evalkeval : ρ ⊗|G〉〈G| 7−→ J(keval ⊗ρ⊗|G〉〈G|).
where |G〉〈G| is again just a classical string instructing Uµ to apply the desired gate. A circuit for
Encpk ◦Uµ ◦Decsk is given below; the gate register is represented by the bottom wire.
Decsk
Uµ
Encpk
We now want to show that (KeyGen′,Enc,Dec,Eval) is a public-key QFHE scheme. The homomorphic
property follows directly from the definition of Eval and the functionality-preserving property of the ob-
fuscator. The security of the encryption scheme follows from IND-CPA security of (KeyGen,Enc,Dec)
and the black-box property of (O,J). The black-box property implies that each execution of the Eval
algorithm is no more useful than providing the server with an encryption of GρG†. However, in the
IND-CPA setting, the adversary can already use the CPA oracle to produce encryptions of arbitrary
plaintexts of her choice (as opposed to just ones which are modifications of the plaintext provided by
the client.) There is one additional wrinkle: by repeatedly applying gates (or even just the identity),
the adversary can also produce multiple encryptions during the challenge round. However, as shown
in [14], single-message IND-CPA is equivalent to multiple-message IND-CPA. By the assumption that
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is IND-CPA secure, it follows that the homomorphic scheme is also secure.
We remark that, in general, the encryption procedure Encpk may require an external source of ran-
domness. This is certainly the case in classical encryption, but may not be required if the Enc algorithm
is allowed to perform measurements. In any case, since we are starting with an IND-CPA public-key
scheme, the adversary already has access to the public key and the ability to encrypt with randomness of
her choice; the ability to choose randomness in Eval is of no additional benefit.
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3.2.5 Public-key quantum money
Quantum money. The idea of “quantum money” first arose in work by Wiesner [38]. The core idea
is simple: use a quantum state for representing currency in such a way that the no-cloning theorem of
quantum mechanics prevents counterfeiting. These ideas were refined and developed further in several
works [2, 3, 10, 18, 33]; some of these works also included explicit proposals based on various hardness
assumptions.
Informally, a quantum money scheme consists of two algorithms: Mint, which produces quantum
states, and Verify, which accepts an input state and then either accepts or rejects. If the different states
produced by Mint are distinguishable, then we refer to them as bills; if they are indistinguishable, then we
call them tokens (if Verify consumes them) or coins (if Verify does not consume them.) In all quantum
money schemes, we imagine an authority (typically called the bank) which runs Mint repeatedly to
produce money; in addition, the Verify algorithm should accept only on states produced by the bank.
Depending on the particular scheme, this might only be true if Verify is executed by the bank (private-
key money), or it might be true for any party (public-key money.)
In this language, Wiesner’s original idea [38] was for a private-key scheme for bills, which is as
follows. Each execution of Mint produces two random classical bitstrings r,s ∈ {0,1}2n as well as an
n-qubit quantum state |ψr〉, with each qubit initialized in one of the states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉, as determined
by the bits of r. The bank records the pair (r,s) in a secret table, and publishes (s, |ψr〉). The bank verifies
by using s to look up the correct r in the table, and then performing the measurements in the correct basis
and checking the results against r.
Public-key money from circuit obfuscation. While private-key money schemes are relatively
straightforward to construct, public-key proposals appear to be much more difficult, and require compu-
tational assumptions. In analogy to its role in producing public-key encryption schemes from private-key
ones (Proposition 2), an obfuscator can sometimes be used to turn private-key money schemes to public-
key ones. The use of an obfuscator to create a particular quantum money scheme was considered by
Mosca and Stebila [33]. Their scheme (in our language) is as follows. Each execution of Mint pro-
duces a Haar-random n-qubit quantum state |ψ〉, together with the obfuscation O(Uψ) of a circuit3 for
Uψ = 1− 2|ψ〉〈ψ |. The bill consists of the pair (O(Uψ), |ψ〉). Verify(|ϕ〉) consists of executing the
following:
|0〉 H • H
|ϕ〉 O(Uψ)
and accepting iff the measurement returns 1. It’s easy to check that the above succeeds only on valid
states; moreover, in that case, the state |ψ〉 is output in the second register, so that verification can be
repeated. To show resistance of the above scheme to counterfeiting, one can use Aaronson’s Complexity-
Theoretic No-Cloning Theorem [2], which states that cloning the state |ψ〉 while in possession of oracle
access to
∣∣Uψ〉 requires Ω(2n/2) queries. The first published proof of this theorem (as well as its first
appearance in the form required here) was in [3].
Unfortunately, we will later show that obfuscation of quantum circuits in the form required by Mosca
and Stebila is impossible. What remains possible is a setting in which both |ψ〉 and O(Uψ) are quantum
states, and another circuit (which is publicly known and independent of |ψ〉) is used for verification.
Moreover, as we will also show, any black-box obfuscation scheme which outputs states that can be
efficiently cloned is also impossible. We thus conjecture the following.
Conjecture 1. If quantum black-box obfuscators exist, then so do public-key quantum money schemes.
3For most |ψ〉, the circuit Uψ will not have polynomial length. However, as pointed out by [2], one can instead select |ψ〉 from
an approximate t-design without a significant loss in security.
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If the relevant obfuscation is a consumable state, then this would result in a token scheme. If it can
be reused to perform verification repeatedly4, then the result would be a bills scheme. We remark that,
in any case, all of the public-key money states discussed above should be authenticated by the bank;
otherwise a merchant would only know that he was handed some pair (state, circuit) where the circuit
executed on the state outputs “accept”—a clearly inadequate state of affairs.
3.3 Impossibility results
3.3.1 Impossibility of two-circuit obfuscation
Barak et. al. [7] showed that black-box obfuscation is impossible by constructing an explicit circuit
family that cannot be black-box obfuscated. We begin with a similar result in the quantum setting. We
show that quantum black-box obfuscation is impossible in any setting where the adversary can gain
access to two outputs of the obfuscator on different inputs. We formalize this notion by defining a
“black-box two-circuit obfuscator,” defined just as in Definition 5 but with the following strengthening
of the virtual black-box condition:
3. (two-circuit virtual black-box) for every pair of quantum circuits C1 and C2 and every quantum
adversary A there exists a quantum simulator SUC1 ,UC2 and a negligible ε2 such that∣∣∣Pr[A(O(C1)⊗O(C2)) = 1]−Pr[SUC1 ,UC2 (|0〉⊗|C1|+|C2|)= 1]∣∣∣≤ ε2(n,min{|C1|, |C2|}) .
We now show that there exists a family of circuits which is unobfuscatable under the above definition.
We emphasize that our result holds even when the outputs of the obfuscator are quantum states, and even
if these states are single-use only, i.e., if the interpreter J irrevocably destroys the obfuscated state during
use.
We first define a circuit-pair family to be an ensemble of distributions over pairs of circuits. More
precisely, if C is a circuit-pair family, then there exists a Turing machine M which, on input a positive
integer parameter n (in unary), outputs a classical description of a pair of circuits (Cn,Dn) drawn at
random from some distribution Cn on pairs of poly(n)-size circuits. If M is polynomial-time, then we
say that C is a poly-time circuit-pair family.
We also define a state-pair family analogously. If C′ is a state-pair family, then there exists a (not
necessarily polynomial-time) quantum algorithm which, on input n in unary, outputs a pair of density
operators (ρn,σn) drawn at random from some distribution C′n on quantum states on poly(n)-many qubits.
Given a circuit-pair family C and a state-pair family C′, we say that C′ is an obfuscation of C if there
exists a computable map C→ C′ assigning to each circuit a corresponding state, in a manner that satisfies
the two-circuit obfuscation definition above.
With these definitions, we can now state our first impossibility result.
Theorem 4. There exists a poly-time quantum circuit-pair family C such that no state-pair family is an
obfuscation of C.
Proof. Let (O,J) be a black-box quantum two-circuit obfuscator. The poly-time quantum circuit-pair
family C consists of quantum circuits for implementing the following pairs of unitary operators. Each
pair is parameterized by an input size n, as well as bitstrings a,b chosen uniformly at random from
{0,1}n.
Ua,b : |x, y〉 7−→
{
|x, y⊕ b〉 if x = a;
|x, y〉 otherwise.
(3.1)
Va,b : |C, z〉 7−→
{
|C, z⊕ 1〉 if C(a) = b;
|C, z〉 otherwise.
(3.2)
4For example, if successful verification also outputs another state which is sufficiently close to the original state.
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The registers indexed by x and y are of size n. The register indexed by C accepts a circuit description
(under some fixed encoding), and needs to be able to handle inputs of size |O(Ca,b)| (i.e. of size equal to
the number of qubits in the state O(Ca,b)). Here Ca,b is a fixed, explicit poly(n)-size circuit for Ua,b. The
second register of Va,b has size one.
Note that both of these unitaries can be implemented by efficient quantum circuits. We choose some
particular set of such circuits, and henceforth denote them by Ca,b and Da,b, respectively. The idea for
the proof is as follows. Consider an adversary A which is ignorant of the randomly selected a and b,
and consider two scenarios: in the first, A is given access to any pair of circuits that implement Ua,b and
Va,b; in the second, A only has oracle access to Ua,b and Va,b. The point is that, in the first case, A can
execute Va,b on a circuit for Ua,b; provided that the latter is not too long, A will achieve something that
is impossible to do with only black-box access. Specifically, it is only in the first case that A will be able
to tell if the first circuit/oracle implements Ua,b, or if it has surreptitiously been replaced by the identity
operator!
Things are somewhat complicated by the fact that the obfuscator outputs states instead of circuits.
We will need to enable A to execute these states on one another. It will thus be necessary to replace Da,b
with a related circuit D′a,b. Roughly speaking, this circuit will check if its input, when interpreted as a
quantum advice state to the algorithm J, maps the input a to the output b. A precise description follows.
First, D′a,b will have three registers: an input register of m qubits, a work register of 2n qubits, and an
output register of 1 qubit initialized in the |0〉 state. When given as input a quantum state ρ on m qubits,
it will initialize the first n bits of the work register to |a〉, then execute the appropriate unitary circuit of J
on ρ⊗|a〉. Finally, if the output register of the latter computation contains |b〉, D′a,b will flip the contents
of the output register. We remark that, by a simple counting argument over circuits, this occurs for only
an exponentially small fraction of possible input states ρ .
Recall that the 2n-qubit identity operator is denoted by 12n, and is implemented by the obvious circuit
which we will denote by I2n. We observe that, for every QPT algorithm S there exists a polynomial t and
a negligible ε1 so that:∣∣∣Pr[SUa,b,D′a,b(|0〉⊗t(n))= 1]−Pr[SId2n,D′a,b(|0〉⊗t(n))= 1]∣∣∣≤ ε1(n) . (3.3)
Here the probability is taken over the uniformly random choice of a and b as well as all of the measure-
ment outcomes of S. The above is an easy corollary of the tightness of the Grover bound for unstructured
quantum search [9]. Indeed, given the definitions of Ua,b and D′a,b, it’s clear that with only polynomial
queries and no knowledge of a or b, S is faced precisely with unstructured search for an exponentially
small “marked space.” This marked space is only encountered if S correctly guesses a, or correctly
guesses an obfuscation of a circuit that maps a to b.
Now consider the QPT algorithm A that, given as input the obfuscated states O(C) and O(D), simply
executes the quantum algorithm J on their tensor product, accepting if and only if the outcome is 1.
Notice that this succeeds with constant probability α > 0 if C is functionally equivalent to Ca,b and D is
functionally equivalent to D′a,b. On the other hand, this same algorithm A accepts with at most negligible
probability when C is functionally equivalent to I2n (and D is still functionally equivalent to D′a,b); indeed,
this only happens is if a = b. Thus there exists a negligible function ε2 so that:∣∣∣Pr[A(O(D′a,b),O(I2n)) = 1]−Pr[A(O(D′a,b)⊗O(Ca,b))= 1]∣∣∣≥ α − ε2(n) . (3.4)
To complete the proof, we explicitly define the poly-time circuit-pair family C. The distribution Cn is
generated by choosing a,b uniformly at random from {0,1}n, and then choosing a bit r ∈ 0,1 at random;
if r = 0, we output the circuit pair (Ca,b,D′a,b), and otherwise we output (I2n,D′a,b). For this distribution,
equations (3.3) and (3.4) together show that no state-pair family is an obfuscation of C.
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3.3.2 Generalizing the impossibility result
Our goal in this section is to extend the two-circuit impossibility proof from the prior section to the case
of obfuscating a single circuit. For our impossibility proof, we require an additional condition on the
obfuscator: that each of its outputs is reusable a polynomial number of times. This is a natural condition
which is automatically satisfied by classical obfuscators (as well as quantum obfuscators with classical
outputs), since their outputs can be perfectly copied.
Definition 6. A reusable-black-box quantum obfuscator is a quantum algorithm O and a QPT J such
that whenever C is an n-qubit quantum circuit, O(C) is an m-qubit quantum state satisfying
1. (polynomial slowdown) m = poly(n, |C|);
2. (functional equivalence) ∥∥J(O(C)⊗ ·)−C · C†∥∥
⋄
≤ negl(n, |C|);
3. (reusability) after execution of J, an output register contains a state which satisfies (2.);
4. (virtual black-box) for every QPT adversary A there exists a QPT simulator SUC such that:∣∣∣Pr[A(ρ(i)) = 1]−Pr[SUC(|0〉⊗|C|)= 1]∣∣∣≤ negl(n, |C|) .
We remark that reusability can be achieved in any number of ways: by providing a state which
partially survives uses by the interpreter J, by providing sufficiently many copies, or by providing a
means of cloning the state. We prove impossibility of the above definition in any setting where the
adversary receives two copies of the obfuscator output, even on identical inputs. This is automatically
satisfied if the obfuscator provides multiple copies in order to satisfy reusability, or if the state is (even
approximately) cloneable. The key new obstacle is to prove impossibility even though the functionality
for both copies is the same.
To state the result, we define (in analogy to circuit-pair families and state-pair families) a circuit fam-
ily to be an ensemble of distributions over circuits, and a state family to be an ensemble of distributions
over states. A state family C′ is said to be an obfuscation of a circuit family C if there exists a computable
map C→ C′ assigning to each circuit a corresponding state, in a manner that satisfies Definition 6. With
these definitions, we will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. If quantum-secure one-way functions exist, then there exists a quantum circuit family C
such that no state family is a reusable-black-box quantum obfuscation of C.
Since the full proof of Theorem 5 is somewhat lengthy and involved, we will first prove a sim-
pler case, showing that quantum circuits cannot be obfuscated into quantum circuits, under any of
the definitions considered so far—even the strongest one, Definition 5.) This corollary (stated below
as Theorem 6) is arguably the most direct quantum generalization of the impossibility result of [6].
Once we have proved it, we will explain in detail how the proof should be adapted in order to achieve
Theorem 5.
Theorem 6. If quantum-secure one-way functions exist, then there exists a quantum circuit family C
such that no quantum circuit family is a black-box obfuscation of C.
Proof. Let O be a black-box quantum obfuscator satisfying Definition 5, such that its outputs are classi-
cal bitstrings. Since these states are used to describe an efficiently implementable quantum computation,
we can assume that these bitstrings are in fact quantum circuits under some particular encoding.
To construct the unobfuscatable circuit family, we will need a notion of combining the functionality
of two quantum circuits into one.
Definition 7. The combined quantum circuit of a finite collection {C1,C2, ...,Ck} of n-qubit quantum
circuits is the circuit that has two registers (a control register of logk qubits, and an input register of
n qubits) and, controlled on the value of the first register, applies the respective quantum circuit to the
input register.
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Notice that if each circuit Ci in the collection is polynomial size, and k is bounded by a polynomial in n,
then the associated combined quantum circuit is also of polynomial size. We will denote the operation
of combining circuits with #. For example, the combined circuit of two circuits C1 and C2 is denoted
C1#C2.
Now recall the two circuits Ca,b and Da,b from Section 3.3.1, as well as the circuit I2n, which simply
implements the identity operator on 2n qubits. Consider the combined quantum circuits Ca,b#Da,b and
I2n#Da,b, sampled by selecting a and b uniformly at random from {0,1}n. We again choose C =Ca,b or
C = I2n, each with probability 1/2, and ask the adversary to determine which is the case. Using the same
reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4 from Section 3.3.1, these combined quantum circuit distributions
are indistinguishable from the perspective of any QPT simulator that is ignorant of a and b, and is given
only black-box access to UC#Da,b . On the other hand, unlike in the prior proof, it is not immediately
apparent how to distinguish the two possibilities given a circuit description of O(C#Da,b). Still, the idea
is simple. Suppose we have two copies of the circuit. We can hard-wire the control register of one copy
to implement Da,b, and hard-wire the control register of the other copy to implement C. If we then run
the first copy on the second, the result should be equivalent to implementing Da,b on input C, which will
determine the nature of C and conclude the proof just as in Theorem 4.
Unfortunately, this idea does not work as stated, because the two circuit copies have the same size.
Since they are functionally nontrivial, their input size is much smaller than their description, making
it impossible to run one on the other. The core difficulty is that Da,b cannot be made large enough to
universally execute circuits of size |O(C#Da,b)| > p(|Da,b|) where p is the running time of O. This
issue arises in the classical proof as well, and is resolved as follows. First, note that we could have
Da,b simply provide a and b, thus offloading the gate-by-gate execution of C to the algorithm A in the
black-box definition. Unfortunately, this would also provide the simulator S with a and b, enabling it to
simulate A. The resolution is to have Da,b provide encryptions of a and b, as well as a quantum fully-
homomorphic encryption (QFHE) oracle for homomorphically applying the gates of C. We emphasize
that the functionality and security of the QFHE oracle crucially depends on the obfuscation property; in
particular, an actual QFHE scheme is not required for the proof.
Concretely, we prove the following Lemma, which is a quantum analogue of Lemma 3.6 (including
Claim 3.6.1) from [7].
Lemma 7. If quantum-secure one-way functions exist, then for each n ∈ N and a,b ∈ {0,1}n, there
exists a distribution Da,b over circuits such that:
1. There exists a PPT algorithm that, given n ∈ N and a,b ∈ {0,1}n, samples from Da,b;
2. There is a QPT algorithm A so that C|a〉|0n〉 = |a〉|b〉 implies AUD(C,1n) = a; this holds for all
n ∈ N, all a,b ∈ {0,1}n, any D ∈ supp(Da,b), and every n-qubit circuit C;
3. For any QPT S, Pr[SUD(1n) = a]≤ negl(n), where the probability is over a,b ∈ {0,1}n, D ∼Da,b,
and the measurements of S.
Proof. The distribution Da,b will be sampled by choosing k,r ∈R {0,1}2n. The bitstring k is to serve
as a private key for the IND-CCA1-secure symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme from Theorem 2.
Each circuit D ∈ supp(Da,b) will be a combination (again via #) of the following three circuits.
1. EK,a; this outputs Enck(|a〉), executed with randomness r.
2. HomK(G,ρ); on input a gate description G and a state ρ , it outputs [Enck ◦G◦Deck](ρ).
3. Bk,a,b; on input ρ , it outputs |a〉 if Deck(ρ) = |b〉 and |0n〉 otherwise.
We remark that the Hom oracle requires randomness in order to re-encrypt the state. This is handled in
the usual way: we expand the input in some register via a (quantum-secure) pseudo-random function;
these exist by the assumption of quantum-secure one-way functions and Theorem 1.
Clearly, given a and b, Da,b can be sampled efficiently by choosing k uniformly at random and
outputting the combined quantum circuit Dk,a,b := Ek,a#Homk#Bk,a,b. This establishes Property 1 from
the Lemma. For Property 2, let A be the algorithm that, on input a quantum circuit C, (i.) uses the first
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two circuits comprising Dk,a,b to homomorphically simulate C gate-by-gate on a, and then (ii.) plugs the
final state into BK,a,b.
To complete the proof of Lemma 7, we must verify Property 3, i.e., that no QPT simulator algorithm
that has black-box access to each of the three algorithms comprising DK,a,b can discover a with non-
negligible probability. This amounts to showing that∣∣∣Pr[SHomk,Enck(Enck(|0〉)) = 1]−Pr[SHomk,Enck(Enck(|a〉)) = 1∣∣∣≤ negl(n) , (3.5)
where the probabilities are over k ∈R {0,1}n and the measurement outcomes of S. We proceed by
contradiction, and assume that there’s a QPT S that violates the claim.
First, we replace the responses to all of S’s queries to the Homk oracle with encryptions of |0n〉, and
deploy a hybrid argument to show that the success probability of S is not significantly affected. To this
end, consider the following hybrids of the computation of S on input Enck(|a〉): in the i-th hybrid, the
first i oracle queries of S are answered using Homk, and the rest are answered with Enck(|0n〉). Notice
that any gap in distinguishing between the i and i+ 1st hybrid must be due to the i+ 1st query S makes
to Homk. We can use this to create a CCA1 adversary T which breaks the encryption scheme, as follows.
The QPT T simulates S and replies to its first i oracle queries by means of T’s Enck and Deck oracles.
Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext, T passes it to S as the response to its i+1st oracle query. Finally,
T answers the remaining oracle queries of S with EncK(|0n〉). We conclude that, if S violated (3.5), then
T succeeds with non-negligible probability. This establishes (by contradiction) that we can replace the
oracle queries of S with Enck(|0〉). With this replacement, S can distinguish an encryption of |0n〉 from
an encryption of |a〉, when given access to only an encryption oracle, which again contradicts IND-CCA1
security of the scheme.
Now we are ready to describe the unobfuscatable family of quantum circuits and complete the proof
of Theorem 6. First, for a fixed a,b ∈ {0,1}n we let Da,b be the distribution over circuits constructed in
Lemma 7. Then consider the following two distributions over circuits:
1. Fn: Choose a,b ∈R {0,1}n, sample a circuit Da,b from Da,b and output Ca,b#Da,b
2. Gn: Choose a,b ∈R {0,1}n, sample a circuit Da,b from Da,b and output I2n#Da,b
By Property 2 of Lemma 7 there exists an algorithm A that, on input O(C0), accepts if C0 was sampled
from Fn and rejects if C was sampled from Gn. Thus there exists a constant α and a negligible function
ε1 so that: ∣∣∣Pr[A(O(Fn)) = 1]−Pr[A(O(Gn))= 1]∣∣∣≥ α − ε1(n) .
On the other hand, by Property 3 of Lemma 7, we know that for every QPT S there exists some negligible
function ε2 so that: ∣∣∣Pr[SFn(|0〉⊗n)= 1]−Pr[SGn(|0〉⊗n)= 1]∣∣∣≤ ε2(n) .
We conclude that the circuit family formed by taking the union of Fn with Gn (and assigning them each
equal probability) is an unobfuscatable circuit family.
We now return to the proof of Theorem 5, and show how to extend the above proof to the case where
the obfuscator outputs reusable quantum states.
Proof. (of Theorem 5) Our proof will still use the same distribution Da,b over circuits, which were
provided by Lemma 7 and described above, but with some slight modifications. The goal will still be to
take two copies of O(C0) for any circuit C0 sampled from that distribution, and give an algorithm A that
can “execute one copy on the other.” This will enable us to distinguish if C0 is from the distribution Fn,
or the distribution Gn (just as above), a task which is impossible with only black-box access.
However, executing one copy of O(C0) on another is now somewhat more complicated, due to the
fact that we no longer have explicit circuit descriptions in hand, and must instead use the interpreter
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J (with some register initialized to O(C0)) whenever we want to run C0. To do this, we will need to
describe a new distribution D′a,b of circuits, closely related to the distribution Da,b from Lemma 7.
Attempt 1. To warm up, a first attempt at describing A and the modified circuits D′a,b from the
distribution D′a,b is as follows. First, we simply define D′a,b to be a composition of circuits which simply
output both a and b. Set C0 =C#D′a,b, and suppose that inputting |0〉 in the first register executes the first
circuit in the combination, while |1〉 executes the second circuit in the combination. The algorithm A is
in possession of two copies of O(C0). It performs:
1. run J(O(C0)⊗|1〉|0n〉) to retrieve |a〉|b〉 (by functional equivalence of O);
2. run J(O(C0)⊗|0〉|a〉) (now using the other copy of O(C0));
3. compare the result to |b〉.
This does exactly what we want, except of course that the black-box simulator S will also be able to
retrieve a and perform this experiment. Our valiant attempt failed.
Attempt 2. Undeterred, we now try a more sophisticated approach, returning to the idea of encryption
and homomorphic execution. We now ask that (as before) D′a,b outputs an encryption Enc(a) of a (when
given the flag A), implements a Hom oracle (when given the flag H), and checks if the input is Enc(b)
(when given the flag B). We again set C0 =C#D′a,b and give A two copies of O(C0); for convenience we
denote them O(C0) and O(C0)′. Now, A performs:
1. run J
(
O(C0)⊗ [|1A〉⊗ |0n〉]
)
to retrieve Enc(a);
2. run J
(
O(C0)⊗ [|1H〉⊗O(C0)′⊗|0〉⊗Enc(a)]
)
to “homomorphically run C”;
3. run J
(
O(C0)⊗ [|1B〉⊗ρ ]
)
where ρ is the output of the previous step; output the result.
The first and last step are largely self-explanatory: we start with the encryption of a, and check at the
end that we have the encryption of b. What happened in the second step? We tried to homomorphically
evaluate5 C on Enc(a). By functional equivalence of O, we executed the first copy of C0 on input
|1H〉⊗O(C0)′⊗Enc(a); this specifies that D′a,b should run the Hom oracle with input O(C0)′⊗Enc(a).
To make this sensible, we can redefine Hom to accept two registers, and homomorphically evaluate the
appropriate circuit of J; the result is that, whenever Hom is called on O(C)⊗Enc(z) for a circuit C and
state z, the output is Enc(C(z)).
This attempts looks like it succeeds, but there is a disastrous flaw: Hom must now accept inputs with
at least as many qubits as O(C0), which is significantly bigger than the circuit description allowed for
Hom itself (since it is a part of D′a,b and hence also of C0).
Attempt 3. In the final attempt, we will repair the flaw of Attempt 2. The key is to again offload
some of the execution, but this time from the Hom oracle to the main algorithm A. More precisely, we
will expand step (2) in Attempt 2, and execute it gate-by-gate. In this iteration, Hom is back to its original
version, and is used only to apply two-qubit gates. It accepts n input qubits, decrypts them, applies the
desired gate (as specified in another register), and then re-encrypts. In addition, will also expand D′a,b to
provide an Enc oracle (when given the flag E); we can do this for free, by equation (3.5) in Lemma 7.
The final algorithm A will proceed as follows. Here we have let m denote the number of qubits of O(C0)′,
and we let Jm be the circuit of J for executing m-qubit obfuscated states.
1. run J
(
O(C0)⊗ [|1E〉⊗O(C0)′(k)]
)
for all k ∈ [m], to encrypt all qubits of O(C0)′;
2. run J
(
O(C0)⊗ [|1A〉⊗ |0n〉]
)
to retrieve Enc(a);
3. let j = 0 and let σ j := Enc(a);
4. let G j be the jth gate in the description of Jm;
(a) let s, t be the qubits G j acts on; assume s is a qubit of O(C0)′ and t is a qubit of σ j;6
5Selecting C was done by passing the bit flag |0〉 into the control register.
6This assumption is only made for simplicity of the algorithm description; the other possibilities are similar.
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(b) set σ j+1 = J
(
O(C0)⊗ [|1H〉⊗
∣∣G j,s, t〉⊗Enc(O(C0)′(s))⊗σ j]); 7
(c) if j = |Jm|, continue; otherwise increment j by 1 and go to step 4.
5. run J
(
O(C0)⊗ [|1B〉⊗σ j]
)
and output the result.
A few remarks are in order. First, the reusability of the state O(C) was crucial in our ability to repeatedly
execute the Hom oracle in step 4.(b). Second, one checks that by the functional equivalence of the
obfuscator and the definition of the Hom oracle, if C0 = Ca,b#D′a,b then the state σ j when step 5. is
reached will indeed be Enc(b). Third, note that the “compactness” issue of Hom from Attempt 2 has
been resolved, and the input to C0 in step 4.(b) is now of size n (plus a constant.)
Finally, despite all of the difficulties in defining the algorithm A appropriately, the hardness of the
corresponding search problem for the black-box simulator S is essentially unchanged from the proof
of Theorem 6. The only difference is that D′a,b now also provides an encryption oracle; the encryption
scheme we selected is certainly secure in this setting.
To finish the proof, we again build a circuit family by choosing Ca,b#D′a,b or I2n#D′a,b, each with
equal probability, for random a and b. By the above arguments, this circuit family is unobfuscatable.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.
4 Quantum indistinguishability obfuscation
In this section, we analyze a different definition of quantum obfuscation, motivated by classical defi-
nitions established by Goldwasser and Rothblum [25]. As opposed to the black-box approach, these
definitions assess the quality of an obfuscation in relative terms, e.g., as compared to other functionally-
equivalent circuits (or, in the quantum case, states).
4.1 CPTP circuits and ensembles of states
For our discussions on indistinguishability obfuscation, we modify the notations of Section 1.3 slightly,
as follows.
First, henceforth we take the point of view that any quantum circuit C can include unitary gates as
well as measurement gates and instructions for discarding qubits. In keeping with this view, we overload
notation so that C denotes both the circuit itself (i.e., a classical description of a set of wires and gates)
as well as the CPTP map that the circuit implements.
Second, we allow our ensembles to be indexed by infinite sets of strings rather than the natural
numbers. As before, we will denote ensembles by italicized capital letters (and optionally place the
indexing set in the subscript.) Elements of the ensemble will be denoted by the corresponding non-
italicized capital letter (optionally, with the index in the subscript.) So, for example, we may write
CS := {Cs : s ∈ S}. Just as in the single-circuit case, we will overload this notation for circuit ensembles
and use it to also refer to the corresponding family of CPTP maps. We will need one new definition in
this context: given two circuit ensembles CS and DS, we say that CS is functionally equivalent to DS
(denoted CS ∼=DS) if the circuits themselves are functionally equivalent, i.e., if ‖Cs −Ds‖⋄ ≤ negl(|s|)
for all s ∈ S.
We will also now need to handle infinite collections of states. We thus define a state ensemble
to be an infinite collection {ρx : x ∈ X} of density operators indexed by some set X ⊂ {0,1}∗, such
that ρx ∈ D(Hp(|x|)) where p is bounded by some fixed polynomial function. We remark that a circuit
ensemble is a special case of a state ensemble, where each state is a classical string describing wires,
gates, and so on. A uniform state ensemble will be a state ensemble {ρx : x ∈ X} together with a
uniform circuit ensemble {Cx : x∈ X} such that ρx =Cx|0m〉 for appropriately chosen m. We remark that
a QPT is defined by choosing a uniform circuit ensemble, and that the set of possible outputs of a QPT
are a uniform state ensemble. In particular, if S is a state ensemble and A is a QPT, then (ignoring some
7The notation O(C0)′(s) is meant to indicate that only the s-th qubit of that state is to be placed in the input register.
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uninteresting bookkeeping) we may write A(S) to denote the state ensemble that results from running A
on inputs from S. Note that if S is uniform, then A(S) is also uniform.
Next, we consider three different notions of distinguishability for state ensembles, in order of de-
creasing power. We will write R ≈ S to indicate that R and S are indistinguishable state ensembles; the
type of indistinguishability should be clear from context. Let R= {ρx : x ∈ X} and S= {σx : x ∈ X} be
two state ensembles. We say that R and S are perfectly indistinguishable if ρx = σx for every x ∈ X .
While this is an unnatural notion of indistinguishability for general quantum states, it is more reasonable
(and is easy to test for individual cases) if ρx and σx happen to all be classical. A weaker notion is sta-
tistical indistinguishability, which demands that ‖ρx−σx‖tr ≤ poly(|x|) for all but finitely many x ∈ X .
In the weakest notion we will consider, we say that R and S are computationally indistinguishable if
for every QPT A,
|Pr[A(ρx) = 1]−Pr[A(σx) = 1]| ≤ negl(|x|)
for all but finitely many x; here the probabilities are taken over the coins and measurements of A. One
may also consider a non-uniform version of the above definition, in which A also ranges over non-
uniform circuit families, and is allowed access to an auxiliary state ensemble {ξx : x ∈ X}. All of our
results hold (with appropriate adjustments) for both the uniform and the non-uniform setting; we will
focus on the uniform setting for convenience.
4.2 Definitions: indistinguishability, best-possible
We begin with the notion of a quantum indistinguishability obfuscator. As before, the interpreter and the
obfuscated state must be efficient, while the obfuscation algorithm itself might not be. We also assume
that all “interpreter” algorithms J have two registers: an advice register (where the obfuscated state is to
be inserted), and an input register (where the input is to be inserted.) It will thus be convenient to write,
e.g., Jρ for the CPTP map family defined by the circuits of J with the advice register initialized to the
state ρ .
Definition 8. A quantum translator is a quantum algorithm O and a QPT J such that whenever C is a
circuit ensemble and C ∈ C is an n-qubit circuit,
1. (polynomial slowdown) O(C) has at most poly(n) qubits;
2. (functional equivalence) ∥∥JO(C)−C∥∥⋄ ≤ negl(n);
Definition 9. A quantum statistical (resp., computational) indistinguishability obfuscator is a quantum
translator (O,J) such that whenever CS and DS are functionally-equivalent circuit ensembles with |Cs|=
|Ds| for all s ∈ S, then O(CS) and O(DS) are statistically (resp., computationally) indistinguishable.
Note that an obfuscator which simply outputs circuit descriptions is included as a special case of
the above; in that case, O(C) is always a quantum circuit, and J is a universal circuit which executes
O(C) on the state given in the input register. One may also define a quantum perfect-indistinguishability
obfuscator, where the obfuscated states O(C1) and O(C2) are identical. We remark that the condition of
equal length can be relaxed to any fixed polynomial (e.g., |C1| can be of length at most |C2|2.)
The notion of indistinguishability obfuscation may not seem intuitive at first. To begin to see why
it is a useful definition, we now show that it is equivalent to a semantic definition of obfuscation. To
achieve this, we first need to properly define functional equivalence for state ensembles. If we fix a
quantum translator (O,J), then the QPT J defines a way to implement functionality via states. We then
say that two state ensembles RX and SX are functionally equivalent if∥∥Jρx −Jσx∥∥⋄ ≤ negl(|x|)
for all but finitely many x ∈ X , ρx ∈ RX and σx ∈ SX . In this case, we will write RX ∼=J SX . This allows
us to compare the relative strengths of one obfuscated ensemble versus another, as follows.
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Definition 10. A quantum statistical (resp., computational) best-possible obfuscator is a quantum
translator (O,J) such that for any QPT A there exists a QPT S with the following property: for ev-
ery circuit ensemble CX and any uniform state ensemble RX which is functionally-equivalent to O(CX)
and has same-size states8, we have that A(O(CX)) and S(RX ) are statistically (resp., computationally)
indistinguishable.
This definition captures the relative “leakage” of the obfuscated state ensemble: among all functionally-
equivalent state ensembles (i.e., potential obfuscations), the best-possible obfuscation is the ensemble
that leaks the least. From this point of view, we think of A as a “learner” which tries to learn something
from the obfuscated ensemble, and S as a “simulator” which can learn the same thing as A, but from any
other functionally-equivalent ensemble.
Proposition 1. Let (O,J) be a polynomial-time quantum translator. Then (O,J) is a quantum statistical
(resp., computational) best-possible obfuscator if and only if it is a quantum statistical (resp., computa-
tional) indistinguishability obfuscator.
Proof. First, let (O,J) be a best-possible obfuscator. Set A to be the trivial learner which simply imple-
ments the identity operator, and let S be the corresponding simulator. Let C and D be two functionally-
equivalent circuit ensembles with same-size circuits. Note that their obfuscations are functionally-
equivalent (i.e., O(C)∼=J O(D)) same-size ensembles. By two applications of the best-possible property
(one on the left, and one on the right), we get
O(C) =A(O(C))≈ S(O(D))≈A(O(D)) = O(D) ,
where ≈ denotes the appropriate form of indistinguishability (statistical or computational.) It follows
that (O,J) is an indistinguishability obfuscator.
For the other direction, let (O,J) be an indistinguishability obfuscator. Given a learner A, define a
simulator S as follows. Let (C,R) be a (circuit, ensemble) pair as in the best-possible definition. Since
R is a uniform state ensemble, there is a corresponding circuit ensemble D for preparing it. Given a
circuit D ∈ D and the corresponding circuit J ∈ J of the interpreter, we can then build a circuit D ◦ J
which is functionally equivalent to the corresponding circuit C ∈ C (by the definition of a quantum
translator.) Let D◦J be the corresponding circuit family, and define S(R) = S(O(D◦J)). Now, by the
indistinguishability property, O(C)≈ O(D◦J), from which it follows that
A(O(C))≈A(O(D◦J)) = S(R) ,
as desired.
We remark that the forward implication did not require the obfuscator to be efficient.
4.3 Impossibility of statistical obfuscation
In this section, we show that efficient perfect or statistical indistinguishability obfuscation is impossible.
We begin by recalling the following computational problems about distinguishability of circuit ensembles
and state ensembles, and some relevant complexity-theoretic results.
Problem 1. Circuit distinguishability.
Input: two quantum circuits C and D; parameter ε > 0.
Promise: ‖C−D‖⋄ is greater than 2− ε or less than ε .
Output: YES in the former case and NO in the latter.
Problem 2. Quantum State Distinguishability.
Input: m-qubit quantum circuits C0 and C1, positive integer k ≤ m and parameters a,b with a < b2.
Promise: let ρi = Tr(k+1,m)[Ci|0m〉〈0m|C†i ]; then ‖ρ0−ρ1‖tr is greater than b or less than a.
Output: YES in the former case and NO in the latter.
8meaning that, for each x ∈ X , the corresponding states in the two ensembles have the same number of qubits.
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Theorem 8. [34] The problem Circuit distinguishability is QIP-complete for every ε > 0.
Theorem 9. [36] The problem Quantum State Distinguishability is QSZK-complete.
The following theorem is a straightforward matter of assembling the above results together with the
definition of indistinguishability obfuscation.
Theorem 10. If there exists a polynomial-time quantum statistical indistinguishability obfuscator, then
PSPACE is contained in QSZK.
Proof. We will actually show QIP⊂BQPQSZK; since BQP is contained in QSZK and QIP = PSPACE [30],
the result will follow. We will solve Circuit distinguishability using a subroutine that solves Quantum
State Distinguishability. Given the classical descriptions of C and D, we run the obfuscator O on both
to get states O(C) and O(D). Now we apply the subroutine, and output its result.
Note that, if C and D are elements of a pair of functionally-equivalent circuit ensembles, then O(C)
and O(D) will be indistinguishable and the subroutine will output YES. On the other hand, if C and D
are far from being functionally equivalent, then there exists some input on which they differ significantly.
It follows that O(C) and O(D) must be distinguishable; if they were not, then JO(C) and JO(D) would be
functionally equivalent, contradicting the translator conditions in the definition of the obfuscator.
In addition, we can prove an impossibility result for the case of statistical obfuscators which can only
obfuscate unitary circuits. We first recall the Identity Check problem. Given an m-qubit state ρ and
indices l,k ≥ 0, we let Trl,k[ρ ] denote the result of tracing out qubits l through k of ρ . We adopt the
convention that nothing is traced out (i.e., Trl,k[ρ ] = ρ) if l > m.
Problem 3. Identity Check.
Input: an n-qubit unitary quantum circuit C and parameters a,b so that b− a≥ 1/poly(n).
Promise: minα ‖C− eiαI‖ is less than a or greater than b.
Output: YES in the former case and NO in the latter.
Theorem 11. [31] The problem Identity Check is coQMA-complete.
Theorem 12. If there exists a polynomial-time quantum statistical indistinguishability obfuscator for
unitary circuits, then coQMA is contained in QSZK.
Proof. We will actually show coQMA ⊂ BQPQSZK; since BQP is contained in QSZK, the result will
follow. Let a and b satisfy b− a = 1/poly(n). We will solve Identity Check using a subroutine that
solves Quantum State Distinguishability.
Let C be the input, i.e., a classical description of an n-qubit quantum circuit. Create an identity circuit
D with an equal number of inputs as C, and of equal length to C. Let OC be a circuit that initializes a
register with the classical state |C〉 containing the classical description of C, and applies the circuit of
O which corresponds to the input length |C|. Likewise, let OD be a circuit that initializes a register
with the classical state |D〉 containing the classical description of D, and applies the circuit of O which
corresponds to the input length |D|= |C|. Note that, after tracing out ancillas, the outputs of these circuits
are given by
Tranc.
[
OC|0〉〈0|O†C
]
= O(C) and Tranc.
[
OD|0〉〈0|O†D
]
= O(D) .
Now apply the subroutine for solving quantum state distinguishability to the pair (OC,OD). If it says
“close”, we output YES; otherwise we output NO. Let’s show that this has solved (a,b)-identity-check.
Note that the states O(C) and O(D) must have the same number of qubits, and denote that number by m.
• completness. In this case, the obfuscated states satisfy ‖O(C)−O(D)‖tr ≤ α . By the definition of
the induced trace norm, this implies that ‖Jn
O(C)−J
n
O(D)‖⋄ ≤ α . By functional equivalence for C
and D and the triangle inequality, it follows that ‖UC−UD‖⋄ = ‖UC− I‖⋄ ≤ α , as desired.
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• soundness. In this case, the obfuscated states satisfy ‖O(C)−O(D)‖tr ≥ β . We claim that this
implies ‖UC −UD‖⋄ > b. Suppose this is not the case, i.e., that these operators are in fact close;
then by the indistinguishability property, it would follow that O(C) and O(D) are close as well, a
contradiction.
The above amounts to a BQPQSZK protocol for a coQMA-hard problem, thus placing coQMA in QSZK.
4.4 Application: quantum witness encryption
We now give an interesting application of the surviving case of quantum indistinguishability obfuscation,
i.e., the computational variant.
The classical idea of witness encryption was first studied in [20]; its connection to indistinguishability
obfuscation was first considered in [19]. In the quantum case, we set up the problem as follows. Suppose
Alice wishes to encrypt a quantum state ρ , but not to a particular key or for a particular person; instead,
the encryption is tied to a challenge question, and anyone that can answer the question correctly can
decrypt the plaintext. The question will be of a particularly quantum nature: a correct answer will be a
quantum state, e.g., the ground state of some Hamiltonian.
More formally, we consider a QMA language L, and would like to enable Alice to encrypt her state
ρ using a particular problem instance x. If x is a “yes” instance, then we’d like to allow Bob, who holds
a witness state, to be able to decrypt Alice’s message. On the other hand, if x is a no instance, then
we demand that no QPT can distinguish between encryptions of any two quantum states on the same
number of qubits. Interestingly, the definition says nothing about the case where x is a yes instance but
a witness is not known. While this may seem counterintuitive, the classical primitive has a number of
natural applications (e.g., public-key encryption and identity encryption, see [20]). It is likely that the
quantum primitive has the same or similar applications, but we will not explore that question here.
We now show that witness encryption for QMA is possible, assuming the existence of a quantum
computational-indistinguishability obfuscator. It is well-known (see, e.g., [26]) that QMA contains lan-
guages L which have a poly-time uniform circuit family CL with completeness 1−2−Ω(n) and soundness
2−Ω(n). Given an instance x of such a language L, and a quantum state ρ , consider the quantum circuit
Qx,ρ (σ), which runs the appropriate circuit from CL and outputs ρ on accept, and |0n〉 otherwise. We
claim the computational-indistinguishability obfuscation O(Qx,ρ) is a valid witness encryption for L and
ρ . Correctness of decryption is clear, since the ability to provide a valid witness for L allows Bob to
use O(Qx,ρ) to obtain Alice’s state ρ . Of course, if x is not in L, then no witness will suffice; more
precisely, ‖Qx,ρ1 −Qx,ρ2‖ ≤ 2−Ω(n) for any two quantum states ρ1,ρ2 on the same number of qubits.
By the indistinguishability condition of Definition 9, the obfuscation of Qx,ρ1 will be computationally
indistinguishable from the obfuscation of Qx,ρ2 .
5 Conclusion
5.1 Open problems
The central remaining open problem is whether quantum-mechanical means of obfuscation are possible,
within the restricted framework placed by our results. In the classical setting, it is known that black-box
obfuscation and statistical obfuscation are impossible; on the other hand, it is generally believed that
computational-indistinguishability obfuscation can be achieved. In the quantum setting, on the other
hand, much less is known. Although our results place some significant restrictions, several possibilities
remain. For example, it is conceivable that information-theoretically secure black-box obfuscation of a
program is possible using quantum-mechanical means. Moreover, such a construction may even enable
the user to use the obfuscated state to evaluate the program a polynomial number of times. Such an
obfuscator would be tremendously powerful, and would be another example of quantum supremacy in
the world of cryptography. It is difficult to imagine how such an obfuscation would function for arbitrary
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quantum programs (due to restrictions placed by the monogamy of entanglement); it is perhaps more
reasonable to imagine it for classical functions. In that case, one could imagine using the state to perform
the computation, then copying the (classical) output of the program, and restoring the obfuscated state
by undoing the unitary circuit.
In the indistinguishability setting, constructions for obfuscating quantum programs are not known. It
is conceivable that classical ideas (such as those in [19]) can be translated to the quantum setting. How-
ever, a key ingredient in [19] is fully-homomorphic encryption, which is yet to be achieved quantumly—
although significant progress in this direction was recently made by Broadbent and Jeffery [14].
In terms of applications, our results raise another interesting question: what applications can we envi-
sion for obfuscators whose outputs are not cloneable or reproducible? Many of the standard applications
are restricted in the case. On the other hand, one may be able to design applications where the inability
to copy the obfuscator’s output is a desired feature. In fact, one can imagine quantum obfuscators where
the number of executions is highly limited in a manner analogous to one-time programs (see, e.g., [15]);
this could also be of use in cryptographic settings.
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